Non-proliferation advocates chafing at what they claim to be the Bush Administration's blanket exemption from standard nuclear trade restrictions being offered to India at the forthcoming meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are still trying to rally support to impose punitive conditions.
A draft of the US proposal submitted on August 6 to Germany, the current chair of the NSG, shows that Washington has by and large acquiesced with India's reasoning that it should be treated as a special case nuclear power, effectively protecting it from the orthodoxy designed for non-nuclear weapon states.
The US proposal, published by the Washington DC-based Arms Control Association, will be taken up by the NSG on August 20-21 in Vienna for initial consideration. The NSG, which typically operates by consensus, is expected to convene again on September 2 for a final decision.
The word out of Vienna is that while some smaller NSG states are voicing their reservations on the India specific waivers and loose language of the proposals, the US has the situation under control with broad support from major NSG members.
But the hardline ACA, loosely referred to as comprising "non-proliferation ayatollahs," is fulminating about the Bush administration allowing India to circumvent provisions of the domestic Hyde Act with extraordinary generosity at the NSG, while trying to gain some traction among smaller NSG members.
Several NSG members have raised questions about rewarding India with greater opportunities to engage in international nuclear trade while India continues to refuse to constrain its nuclear weapons program, the ACA insisted in a lengthy analysis of the US proposal. Generally speaking, it argued, any India-specific exemption from NSG guidelines would erode the credibility of the NSG's efforts to ensure that access to peaceful nuclear trade and technology is available only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards.
Specific to the current US proposal, the ACA said, "one of the most notable and troublesome features is the weak and very ambiguous language" in section 2, which is ostensibly meant to outline what India has done that qualifies it for a special exemption from NSG guidelines. The proposal would simply "recognize" India's commitments and actions that were outlined in the July 2005 joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Section 3 would allow individual NSG members to engage in a full range of nuclear trade with India without any legally or politically meaningful requirement that would link nuclear trade with India to implementation and compliance with the commitments and actions mentioned in section 2.
The proposal would only require that: "Participating Government shall maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India."
This, the ACA complained, is a much weaker formulation than the already weak March 2006 US draft proposal, which stated that: "Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India...as long as the participating Government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, and all other requirements of the NSG Guidelines."
Furthermore, the ACA said, the current US proposal would leave it up to each individual NSG participant to decide whether India is or is not meeting these weak standards and loose commitments before they sell nuclear technology and materials (possibly including technologies the U.S would not be willing to sell) to India.
Saturday, August 16, 2008
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